Whose Crime Is It Anyway? The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression by Kostic, Drew
KOSTIC 12_1_11 FINAL FIXED AT CP STAGE(DO NOT DELETE) 12/1/2011 5:20 PM 
 
109 
WHOSE CRIME IS IT ANYWAY? THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE 
CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
DREW KOSTIC* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early hours of June 12, 2010, a vote was taken in Kampala, 
Uganda that changed the face of international criminal law forever. It was 
at this time that the Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) came to a consensus regarding the definition of the crime of 
aggression and the mechanism by which the ICC will eventually exercise 
jurisdiction over it. However, the process of these negotiations was far 
from straightforward; the final text of the amendments consisted of 
numerous provisions and understandings in an attempt to appease the 
concerns of the varying factions that had descended on Kampala for this 
occasion. As a result, the text of the crime of aggression amendments 
remains ambiguous with regard to both the definition of the crime as well 
as its entry into force and exercise of jurisdiction provisions. 
This paper seeks to parse through this ambiguity by addressing the 
questions that will require resolution by the judges at the ICC. The first 
section will provide a brief overview of the negotiations at Kampala as well 
as discuss the final text that became the crime of aggression amendments to 
the Rome Statute. The second section will analyze nine key questions that 
have arisen regarding the elements of the crime as well as the ICC’s ability 
to exercise jurisdiction over it and suggest how judges at the Court will 
likely interpret the text when these situations come about. As the 
amendments will not enter into force until January 1, 2017 at the very 
earliest, this analysis will function as the beginning of a dialogue on these 
topics in order to generate a consensus over their answers and provide for a 
smooth transition into a new era of international criminal law. 
 
        *  Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2012; Colgate University, B.A. 2008. For 
comments and suggestions, I thank Professor Charles Dunlap. I would also like to thank all the 
participants at the 2010 Road From Kampala Conference. This Note is dedicated to Bruce and Kathie 
Kostic. 
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION AMENDMENTS 
A. The Rome Conference 
On July 1, 2002 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
entered into force1 giving the Court jurisdiction over three of the four 
crimes within its mandate.2 The fourth crime, the crime of aggression, 
makes it a crime for an individual to wage an illegal war.3 Despite being 
listed as one of “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community,”4 this crime had been left undefined and without a mode for 
the Court to exercise jurisdiction over it.5 This purposeful oversight was 
done in order to placate countries that were hesitant about an international 
institution having jurisdiction over such a controversial crime.6 This is not 
to say that there had not been consensus as to the need for protection 
against the crime of aggression; even at Nuremberg aggression had been 
called the “supreme international crime”7 and this belief was very much 
alive during the Rome Conference.8 However, the crime of aggression 
imposes unique factors that are not present in the other three crimes under 
the ICC’s jurisdiction.9 For instance, in determining if a war crime or crime 
against humanity has occurred, the ICC does not account for military 
deaths or civilian deaths, which are often considered “collateral damage;”10 
however, both factors influence a determination as to whether a situation 
constitutes an act of aggression.11 A more contentious problem, however, is 
that a decision regarding a crime of aggression indirectly impacts the legal 
sovereignty of a State as opposed to simply influencing the rights of the 
accused.12 In this sense, more so than the other crimes enumerated in the 
 
 1. About the Court, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/ 
About+the+Court/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2011). 
 2. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(2), July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 3. Noah Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 1 (2009). 
 4. Id. at pmbl.  
 5. Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161, 162 (2008).  
 6. Id. at 170-71. 
 7. Jennifer Trahan, The Rome Statute’s Amendment on the Crime of Aggression: Negotiations at 
the Kampala Review Conference, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 49, 50 (2011). 
 8. Jutta F. Bertram-Nothnagel, A Seed for World Peace Planted in Africa: The Provisions on the 
Crime of Aggression Adopted at the Kampala Review Conference for the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, AFR. LEGAL AID Q., 9, 9-10 (Apr.-June 2010) (“[A]t the time of the 
adoption of the Statute in 1998, the international community recognized the horror of the crime. . . .”). 
 9. Id. at 10-11.  
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. at 11. 
 12. See Robert Heinsch, The Crime of Aggression After Kampala: Success or Burden for the 
Future?, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 713, 722 (2010).  
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Rome Statute, the crime of aggression carries with it a political aspect that 
made the delegates at Rome uneasy.13 
Instead, these delegates, aware of the fact that the entire process might 
unravel if they forced the debate revolving around aggression,14 inserted 
two provisions into the Rome Statute that bought some time before any 
decisions had to be made. The first, Article 5(2), provided for the 
possibility of including the crime of aggression into the Court’s mandate by 
stating that “[t]he Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 
123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court 
shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”15 The second, Article 
123, as alluded to in Article 5(2), established a review conference at which 
the Assembly of States Parties, the legislative branch of the Court, could 
propose amendments to the Rome Statute.16 By expressly stating “[s]uch 
review may include, but is not limited to, the list of crimes contained in 
article 5,” the drafters of the Rome Statute made it evident that the crime of 
aggression would not be forgotten.17 
B. The Kampala Conference 
From May 31, 2010 until June 11, 2010 the Assembly of States Parties 
held a review conference in Kampala, Uganda to assess the state of the 
International Criminal Court and its foundational document, the Rome 
Statute, pursuant to article 123.18 While the early days of the conference 
were occupied with other tasks, the primary focus of most of the delegates 
was on the crime of aggression.19 Luckily, between 1998 and 2010, much 
had occurred behind the scenes to prepare for this event. The final act of 
the Rome Conference had assigned a Special Working Group on the Crime 
of Aggression (SWGCA) to “prepare proposals for a provision on 
aggression, including the definition and Elements of Crimes of Aggression 
and conditions under which the International Criminal Court shall exercise 
 
 13. See id. at 716-17.  
 14. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 22, 29 (1999).  
 15. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5(2).  
 16. Id. art. 123. 
 17. Id. art. 123(1). 
 18. See generally Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Kampala, Uganda, May 31-June 11, 2010, ICC Doc. RC/9/11 (2010).  
 19. Roger S. Clark, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Considered at the First Review Conference on the Court, Kampala 31 May-11 June 2010, 2 
GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 689, 690, 692 (2010).  
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its jurisdiction with regard to this crime.”20 As a result, by the time the 
Kampala Conference had come about, much had been decided regarding 
the elements of the crime. By 2010, SWGCA had been able to provide a 
definition of the crime that seemed to generally be deemed agreeable.21 
However, provisions regarding the entry into force of the amendments and 
the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime proved far more 
contentious.22 
Specifically, much of the disagreement amongst the delegates 
revolved around two factors: (1) the level of involvement of the United 
Nations Security Council in determining whether or not the ICC could 
pursue an investigation into the crime of aggression and (2) the manner by 
which the amendments should enter into force.23 Under the United Nations 
Charter, the Security Council has a “monopoly on stating whether a 
situation represents an act of aggression.”24 In line with this thinking, some 
parties, namely permanent Security Council members France and the 
United Kingdom,25 sought to delegate responsibility for the determination 
of a crime of aggression solely to the Security Council.26 Other parties, 
fearing the encroachment of the Security Council on the ICC’s 
independence, sought to provide the option to pursue an investigation by 
State Party referral or under the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers (i.e., at 
the Prosecutor’s discretion) for the crime of aggression,27 as was the case 
for the other crimes in the Rome Statute.28 
On a much more technical level, the delegates also debated as to how 
the proposed amendments would enter into force. While Article 5(2) states 
“[t]he Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123,” it does not 
 
 20. Id. at 693. 
 21. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 719. This definition inevitably became Article 8bis which was 
voted on as part of the amendment to the Rome Statute at Kampala. Clark, supra note 19, at 694.  
 22. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 719; see also Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala 
Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1195-96 (2010).  
 23. See Heinsch, supra note 12, at 716.  
 24. Id.  
 25. See Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1201. 
 26. Jennifer Trahan, The New Agreement on the Definition of the Crime of Aggression, 
http://www.mediafire.com/?yydmndtmmdw (last visited May 2, 2011).  
 27. Trahan, supra note 7, at 61.  
 28. Under the Rome Statute, the Court can gain jurisdiction over a crime through one of three 
triggers: (1) A State Party may refer a crime committed on its territory, or committed by one of its 
nationals, to the Court (State Party Referral); (2) the Prosecutor may investigate a crime committed the 
territory of a State Party, or committed by one of its nationals (Proprio Motu Investigation); or (3) the 
Security Council may refer a crime that has occurred anywhere in the world to the Court (Security 
Council Referral). Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12-15. 
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indicate under which subsection of Article 121 the amendments should 
enter into force.29 Some argued that 121(3), which states “[t]he adoption of 
an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a 
Review Conference on which consensus cannot be reached shall require a 
two-thirds majority of States Parties,”30 should be the proper entry into 
force proceeding because the crime of aggression was to be decided at the 
Kampala Review Conference.31 However, this subsection only discusses 
the “adoption” of amendments, while other subsections explicitly indicate 
procedures for how amendments should “enter into force.”32 Other 
delegates claimed the amendments should enter into force under Article 
121(4),33 which states “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment 
shall enter into force for all States Parties one year after instruments of 
ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations by seven-eighths of them.”34 This interpretation gets 
around the “adoption” limitation that was hampering the proponents of 
Article 121(3), but its threshold of ratification by seven-eighths of the 
States Parties seems unnaturally high given the fact that the crime of 
aggression had already been defined as a crime under the Court’s 
jurisdiction in Article 5.35 
A third contingent contended that the more appropriate subsection was 
Article 121(5), which reads: 
 
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into 
force for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one 
year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In 
respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the 
Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the 
amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its 
territory.36 
 
Proponents of this argument noted that, not only does the subsection 
specifically use the language “enter into force,” but also deals specifically 
 
 29. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5(2).  
 30. See id. art. 121(3) (emphasis added).  
 31. Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1196.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, May 31-June 11, 
2010, Report of the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 46, I.C.C. Doc. RC/9/11, Annex III 
(2010) [hereinafter SWGCA Report]. 
 34. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(4).  
 35. See Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1198.  
 36. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5).  
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with amendments to Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8.37 Likewise, the second sentence 
of the subsection contemplates the exercise of jurisdiction “regarding a 
crime,” suggesting that Article 121(5) is the proper channel for 
amendments to substantive crimes as opposed to procedural aspects of the 
Rome Statute.38 However, with the new amendments entering as 8bis, 
15bis, and 15ter, at least two, and arguably all three, of these amendments 
would not fall under Article 121(5)’s purview of “amendments to articles 5, 
6, 7, and 8.”39 
Furthermore, Article 121(5)’s second sentence posed considerable 
trouble when read along with Article 12(2), which defines the Court’s 
ability to exercise jurisdiction over the crimes under its mandate. 
According to Article 12(2), the Court may exercise jurisdiction over a 
situation if either the territory on which the situation occurred belongs to a 
State Party or if the accused is a national of a State Party.40 However, 
Article 121(5)’s second sentence exempts non-ratifying States Parties—or  
those States that have ratified the Rome Statute but not the amendments—
from the Court’s jurisdiction if the situation occurs on its territory or its 
national is accused of committing the crime.41 These articles present a 
problem if a ratifying State Party’s national commits a crime of aggression 
on a non-ratifying State Party’s territory, or vice versa. According to 
Article 12(2), the ICC should have jurisdiction over the situation, but 
according to Article 121(5)’s second sentence, the ICC should not.42 
Attempts to square this discrepancy lead to two different 
interpretations. Those advocating a “negative understanding” claimed the 
second sentence indicated the Court could only exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression under Article 12(2) if both the victim and the 
perpetrator had accepted the amendment.43 Critics of this “negative 
understanding,” however, argued that this interpretation would give non-
ratifying States Parties an unfair advantage over non-States Parties or those 
 
 37. See Trahan, supra note 7, at 65.  
 38. See Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1196-98.  
 39. Trahan, supra note 7, at 65. Some contend that 8bis is actually an entirely new article 
somewhere between Article 8 and 9. Id. at 65 n.66.  
 40. Article 12(2) states: 
In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of 
the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court . . . : (a) The 
State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board 
a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; (b) The State of which the person 
accused of the crime is a national.  
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(2).  
 41. Id. art. 121(5). 
 42. Compare id. art. 12(2), with id. art. 121(5).  
 43. See SWGCA Report, supra note 33, at 46. 
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States that have not ratified the Rome Statute at all.44 If a “negative 
understanding” were to be read into Article 121(5) then a non-ratifying 
State Party could attack a ratifying State Party with immunity because its 
nationals would be exempt from prosecution under Article 121(5).45 
However, if a non-State Party were to do the same, because the crime 
would occur on the territory of the ratifying State Party, the crime would 
fall under the Court’s jurisdiction according to Article 12(2).46 
Others advocated for a “positive understanding;” this approach 
suggested that the second sentence should only be read as to put non-
ratifying States Parties in the same position as non-States Parties with 
regard to Article 12(2).47 In this way, a ratifying State Party need only be 
either the victim state or the aggressor for the Court to exercise 
jurisdiction.48 Critics of this position noted that it is hard to square this 
interpretation with the actual language of Article 121(5), which clearly 
states that, when a State Party does not ratify the amendments, “the Court 
shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the 
amendment[s] when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its 
territory.”49 
Out of this debate came two main proposals at Kampala: one from 
Argentina, Brazil, and Switzerland (the ABS Proposal) and one from 
Canada (the Canadian Proposal).50 The ABS Proposal presented a unique 
split of Article 121(5) and 121(4) as a solution to the problem of Security 
Council control.51 This proposal provided different entry into force 
mechanisms for the different triggers under which the Court may exercise 
its jurisdiction; one entry into force mechanism would apply to crimes of 
aggression that are referred to the ICC by the Security Council while 
another would apply to those that result from State Party referrals and 
proprio motu investigations. The crime of aggression would enter into 
force for all Security Council referrals under the rules found in the first 
sentence of Article 121(5).52 In other words, one year after a state ratified 
the amendments, the Security Council would have the authority to refer, 
 
 44. Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1197.  
 45. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5).  
 46. Id. art. 12(2).  
 47. Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1197.  
 48. SWGCA Report, supra note 33, at 46.  
 49. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5) (emphasis added).  
 50. See Trahan, supra note 7, at 68, 72 (“The Slovenian Proposal did not appear to significantly 
alter the mix.”).  
 51. See Laura Marschner & Isabelle Olma, The First Review Conference of the International 
Criminal Court, 9 ZEITSCHRIFT INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 529, 532 (2010). 
 52. Id.  
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and the ICC would have the authority to exercise jurisdiction over, a crime 
of aggression in that State or committed by its nationals. However, the 
crime of aggression, with regard to State Party referrals and proprio motu 
investigations, would enter into force under Article 121(4), meaning seven-
eighths of the States Parties had to ratify the amendments for the Court to 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime under these triggers.53 While this 
proposal “received much praise for its ingenuity” and influenced proposals 
to come, it still lacked support due to its heavy reliance on Article 121(4) 
and the unnatural seven-eighths threshold that it requires.54 
Later in the conference, the Canadian delegation responded to the 
ABS faction with a proposal of its own.55 Unlike the ABS Proposal, the 
Canadian paper suggested the amendments enter into force using a 
modified “negative understanding” of Article 121(5). Under this regime, if 
the Security Council had not made a determination regarding a potential 
crime of aggression within six months, the Prosecutor could open an 
investigation under his proprio motu powers as long as the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC had authorized it and “all state(s) concerned” or “the 
state on whose territory the alleged offence occurred and the state(s) of 
nationality of the persons accused” consented to the proceedings.56 Yet, as 
with the ABS Proposal, the Canadian Proposal had its own critics, many of 
whom worried about whether it was realistic to believe that all the parties 
to a dispute surrounding an act of aggression would submit themselves to 
the ICC’s jurisdiction.57 
As the clock wound down on the conference with no clear consensus 
in sight, Ambassador Christian Wenaweser, President of the Assembly of 
States Parties, presented a “non-paper”58 of his own, which attempted to 
bridge the growing rift between the factions.59 Specifically seeking to 
entice the skeptical permanent members of the Security Council, President 
Wenaweser’s non-paper mandated that the amendments not enter into force 
 
 53. See Robert L. Manson, Identifying the Rough Edges of the Kampala Compromise, 21 CRIM. L. 
F. 417, 421 (2010).  
 54. Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1202-03.  
 55. Id. at 1203.  
 56. Trahan, supra note 7, at 70-71.  
 57. Id. at 71. 
 58. A non-paper, or an aide-mémoire, is “a proposed agreement or negotiating text circulated 
informally among delegations for discussion without committing the originating delegation's country to 
the contents.” Aide-Mémoire Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/ 
a/aide-memoire/ (last visited April 26, 2011). 
 59. William A. Schabas, New ‘Non-Paper’ Advances Search for Consensus on Aggression, THE 
ICC REVIEW CONFERENCE: KAMPALA 2010 (June 10, 2010, 3:02 PM), http://iccreviewconference. 
blogspot.com/.  
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until the ratification of thirty States Parties.60 Furthermore, at least one year 
after the thirtieth ratification, and no sooner than January 1, 2017, another 
vote would have to be taken by the Assembly of States Parties as a whole 
before the amendments would come under the Court’s jurisdiction.61 To 
address those States Parties wary of the Security Council monopoly, 
President Wenaweser’s non-paper allowed for State Party referrals and 
proprio motu investigations without requiring express Security Council 
permission.62 Instead, President Wenaweser tempered these modes of 
exercising jurisdiction by instituting four filters: (1) the Security Council 
must take no action regarding the situation in question for six months; (2) 
after six months has elapsed, the Pre-Trial Chamber must grant 
authorization with regard to a State Party referral or a proprio motu 
investigation; (3) States Parties must be allowed to formally “opt out” of 
the amendments after ratifying them, and thereby prevent the Court from 
exercising jurisdiction over their nationals and territory; and (4) the ICC 
may not exercise jurisdiction over non-States Parties at all.63 These filters 
sought to protect the ICC’s independence while simultaneously moderating 
when the Court could exercise its control over the crime. 
Around 12:20 a.m., just minutes into June 12, 2010, the President 
brought his final proposal to the delegates for a vote, which was passed by 
a consensus.64 After years of definitions, discussions, and debates it was at 
this point that the crime of aggression amendments to the Rome Statute 
became a reality. 
C. The Final Agreement 
1. The Elements of the Crime 
While the United Nations praised the agreement at Kampala as 
“historic” and a significant step toward a new “age of accountability,”65 the 
final Articles 8bis, 15bis, and 15ter operate largely as a compromise 
between the many interests expressed at Kampala.66 Article 8bis, which 
encapsulated the elements of the crime of aggression, is divided into two 
 
 60. Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1207-08.  
 61. Id. at 1208.  
 62. See id.  
 63. Trahan, supra note 7, at 80.  
 64. Id. at 82.  
 65. Carsten Stahn, The ‘End’, The ‘Beginning of the End’ or the ‘End of the Beginning’? 
Introducing Debates and Voices on the Definition of ‘Aggression’, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 875, 875 
(2010). 
 66. Trahan, supra note 7, at 82.  
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paragraphs.67 The first paragraph defines the crime of aggression, or the 
individual responsibility that must be tied to an act of aggression. It states 
that the accused must engage in the actions of “planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution” to be liable for the crime, echoing the elements of 
the definition of “waging a war of aggression” used at Nuremberg.68 This 
paragraph also emphasizes that an individual must be in a “leadership” 
position while committing the crime, mandating that the accused be a 
person “in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State.”69 Finally, this paragraph mandates 
that the leader must have control over “an act of aggression which, by its 
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations.”70 The second paragraph, on the other hand, deals 
with what constitutes an actual act of aggression, or what physical actions 
can be deemed aggressive. This section draws heavily from United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX)71 by reciting the text of its 
third article verbatim and explicitly referencing that any act of aggression 
be found “in accordance” with the resolution.72 The reasoning behind this 
approach seems simple: having not had a codified definition for the act of 
aggression since Nuremberg, the use of a definition that had support in the 
United Nations seemed the safest course to follow in order to satisfy all the 
delegates.73 
While Article 8bis remained relatively untouched throughout the 
proceedings at Kampala, the final text of the definition also included a 
series of seven Understandings, supported by the delegations from Canada 
and the United States, in an attempt to clarify the boundaries of the crime. 
One of the United States’ main concerns was the fear that the amendments 
would “criminaliz[e] lawful uses of force.”74 To protect against this 
possibility, the United States proposed the inclusion of Understanding 6, 
 
 67. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 720.  
 68. Id. at 721.  
 69. Id. at 721-22.  
 70. Resolution Adopting Aggression Amendments to Rome Statute, Rev. Conf. of the Rome 
Statute, Kampala, Uganda, May 31-June 11, 2010, Annex I, art. 8bis(1), 13th plen. mtg., I.C.C. Doc. 
RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010) (emphasis added) [hereinafter The Amendments].  
 71. This resolution, passed in 1974, articulates a definition of the Crime of Aggression. See 
Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. 
A/9890, at 142 (Dec. 6, 1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression].  
 72. Id.; Heinsch, supra note 12, at 723. 
 73. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 725.  
 74. Julia Martínez Vivancos, The Crime of Aggression Amendment Adopted at the ICC Review 
Conference in Kampala, Uganda, THE AMERICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS COALITION 
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (July 29, 2010), http://www.amicc.org/docs/ 
Aggression.pdf.  
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which stated that aggression was the “most serious and dangerous form of 
the illegal use of force” and that a determination regarding whether an act 
of aggression has occurred “requires consideration of all the circumstances 
of each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and their 
consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”75 
Canada, however, expressed concern over the fact that the amendments 
could be interpreted to indicate that an act of aggression could be a 
manifest violation of the United Nations Charter if it was “manifestly 
illegal” with regard to just one of the components of character, gravity, or 
scale.76 The Canadians feared that this situation might arise “in a case 
where one component is most prominently present, but the other two are 
completely absent.”77 It was at this delegation’s request that Understanding 
7 came into being, which stated that, in analysing whether the act of 
aggression is a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter, “the three 
components of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a 
‘manifest’ determination.”78 Understanding 7 went on to further clarify that 
“[n]o one component can be significant enough to satisfy the manifest 
standard by itself,”79 indicating that at least two of the components must be 
present for an act of aggression to be deemed a manifest violation of the 
United Nations Charter. 
2. The Entry Into Force and Jurisdiction Structure of the Crime 
The entry into force and jurisdictional regime for the crime of 
aggression is split into two amendments: Article 15bis, which deals with 
State Party referrals and proprio motu investigations, and Article 15ter, 
which deals with Security Council referrals. As a prerequisite, the 
introductory paragraph of the amendments indicates that they shall enter 
into force following the protocol outlined in Article 121(5).80 In addition to 
the requirements under this article, however, Article 15bis also incorporates 
the delay period rule addressed in the non-paper offered by the President at 
Kampala. It requires thirty State Party ratifications and a two-thirds 
majority approval at a revote that can occur no earlier than January 1, 2017 
for the amendments to enter into force.81 Further borrowing from the 
President’s non-paper, with regard to jurisdiction, Article 15bis allows for a 
 
 75. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex III, para. 6 (emphasis added).  
 76. Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1206.  
 77. Id.  
 78. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex III, para. 7.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at para. 1.  
 81. Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(2)-(3). 
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State Party to ratify the amendments and then “opt out” of the Court’s 
jurisdiction over its territory and nationals.82 It likewise provides a 
mandatory six-month delay period between the Prosecutor notifying the 
Secretary General of the United Nations of his intent to investigate an act 
of aggression and his actual ability to do so.83 This delay mechanism is 
presumed to allow ample time for the Security Council to make its own 
determination regarding the situation before the Court can act 
independently. However, unlike the non-paper, before engaging in an 
investigation under his proprio motu powers, the Prosecutor need not seek 
authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber but instead must be authorized 
by the entire Pre-Trial Division.84 In this sense, the Prosecutor must 
convince the majority of a six-judge panel as opposed to a panel composed 
of only three.85 Arguably the most important portion of this Article, 
however, is 15bis(5), which states that, with regard to “a State that is not a 
party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression when committed by that State’s nationals or on its 
territory.”86 This provision, ostensibly, exempts any act of aggression from 
being prosecuted if it occurs on a non-State Party’s territory or has been 
committed by one of its nationals.87 While Article 15bis incorporates these 
numerous requirements and loopholes, Article 15ter is far more 
straightforward; it simply states that the Court may exercise jurisdiction in 
accordance with Article 13(b),88 the provision of the Rome Statute that 
gives the Court the authority to exercise jurisdiction over situations that are 
“referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”89 
Though the delegates in Kampala came to a consensus over the crime 
of aggression amendments, a plethora of questions still remain regarding 
their use in the courtroom. As President Wenaweser remarked, even at the 
Kampala Conference itself, “[t]here was a certain level of understanding 
for the concerns advanced [by critics], but the view prevailed that 
reopening the definition would inevitably lead to its total unraveling.”90 
While this refusal to open the “Pandora’s box” of criticism surrounding the 
 
 82. Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(4).  
 83. Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(6)-(8).  
 84. Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(8).  
 85. Trahan, supra note 7, at 80 n.130.  
 86. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(5).  
 87. Trahan, supra note 7, at 84.  
 88. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15ter(1). 
 89. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b).  
 90. Christian Wenaweser, Reaching the Kampala Compromise on Aggression: The Chair’s 
Perspective, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 883, 883 (2010).  
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crime of aggression was the very reason the delegates were able to achieve 
a consensus at Kampala, it has also left numerous questions and concerns 
for the judges of the ICC to interpret. The second section of this paper 
seeks to address these questions and concerns by first raising and analyzing 
them and then positing the likely interpretations judges will formulate 
when applying these amendments in the courtroom. It will do so in two 
parts: Part II.A will deal with the questions surrounding Article 8bis and 
the elements of the crime while Part II.B will assess Articles 15bis and 
15ter and the questions arising from the entry into force of the amendments 
as well as the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them. While the text of 
the amendments was solidified last summer in Kampala, it is not without its 
ambiguities; as a result, these inquires must be considered in order to 
ensure a smooth transition into this new stage of international criminal law. 
II. QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
AMENDMENTS 
A. Questions Surrounding Article 8bis and the Elements of the Crime 
1. What Is the Meaning of “Effective Control” Under Article 8bis? 
Article 8bis defines the crime of aggression as “the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State.”91 While a leader’s ability to “direct the political or military action of 
a State,” for the most part, can be rather easily assessed, the same cannot be 
said for a leader’s ability to “effectively” exercise control. Generally a 
leader is thought to be the political figurehead of a country such as a 
president, dictator, or king. However, in an expanding global economy, 
business leaders exercise more and more influence over the economic 
survival of countries.92 Likewise, one might plausibly see other 
figureheads, such as religious leaders, exercising a considerable amount of 
control over a country’s laws and policies. As a result, one might make an 
argument that these business and religious leaders then “effectively” 
exercise control for their respective countries. While the history of the 
crime of aggression amendments points in this direction, it is somewhat 
 
 91. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis(1) (emphasis added).  
 92. See RICHARD J. BARNET & JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL CORPORATIONS 
AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 14 (1994) (“The architects and managers of these space-age business 
enterprises understand that the balance of power in world politics has shifted in recent years from 
territorially bound governments to companies that can roam the world. As the hopes and pretensions of 
governments shrink almost everywhere, these imperial corporations are occupying public space and 
exerting more profound influence over the lives of ever larger numbers of people.”).  
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inconclusive. During World War II it was accepted that German 
industrialists could be prosecuted for waging an “aggressive war” if they 
had the economic means to “support, or help to prepare” the war.93 
However, none were actually convicted.94 Furthermore, while the crime of 
aggression is based on this precedent, the charge used at Nuremberg was 
technically not the same crime.95 As a result, the question begs to be asked: 
what types of leaders – whether formal State officials or private actors – 
will be liable for the crime of aggression? 
It is likely that a judge faced with unofficial leaders will still find them 
prosecutable for the crime of aggression. Scholars analyzing the elements 
of the crime have suggested that the focus for determining whether an 
individual can be prosecuted for the crime of aggression should be on the 
leadership component of the definition.96 In other words, a judge faced with 
this scenario should focus on whether the accused was in a position of 
representation for the state, regardless of whether that position was 
formal.97 However, while unofficial leaders that commit an act of 
aggression might be liable under this analysis, it is less likely that they will 
actually be convicted and sentenced than would be the case for official 
leaders. One factor that points to this hypothesis is Article 8bis(2)’s heavy 
focus on “armed force” in its definition of an act of aggression. This 
subsection states that an act of aggression must be “the use of armed force 
by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State.”98 While some have criticized this phrasing 
as being too narrow to include the dangers of modern warfare,99 in the 
present scenario, it is a system of delineation for a judge to use when 
determining if a leader exercises control to the requisite degree.100 Because 
of the need for there to be armed force to constitute an act of aggression, an 
unofficial leader must exercise control over the armed forces of a country 
to become criminally liable. This requirement makes it quite unlikely, 
 
 93. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 722.  
 94. Clark, supra note 19, at 697.  
 95. At Nuremberg it was called “waging a war of aggression” while the ICC has jurisdiction over 
the “crime of aggression.” See Heinsch, supra note 12, at 721. 
 96. Noah Weisbord, Professor of Law, Fla. Int’l Univ., Address at The Road From Kampala 
Conference: An Analysis of the First ICC Review Conference of the Rome Statute (Nov. 13, 2010), 
available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/#webcasts (part 1).  
 97. See id.  
 98. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis(2) (emphasis added).  
 99. Telephone Interview with Don Ferencz, Convener, Global Institute for the Prevention of 
Aggression, (Mar. 31, 2011) (noting that, with a cyber-attack, one could wipe out an entire State’s 
infrastructure, leading to far graver consequences than armed conflicts that might fall under the current 
definition of aggression).  
 100. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 723.  
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though still feasible, that an individual of this nature could be charged with 
the crime of aggression. Interestingly, however, with the development of 
religious extremism in the Middle East, it is not implausible for a judge to 
perceive a religious leader to not only impact the politics of a state,101 but 
presumably the military actions of one as well. Article 8bis(1)’s definition 
of “effective control,” while potentially too narrow to capture leaders that 
lack access to armed forces, is still wide enough to capture those leaders 
who gain this access informally and indirectly. 
2. What Constitutes a Manifest Violation of the United Nations 
Charter Under Article 8bis? 
Article 8bis(1) states that, for individual criminal liability to arise from 
an act of aggression, that act must “by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitute[] a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”102 
While the text gives some indication as to what factors a judge should 
assess in concluding that a violation is “manifest”—the character, gravity, 
and scale of the attack—it does not indicate what level of each factor makes 
for a manifest violation. In other words, where does the “manifest” 
threshold lie along the gradient from small-scale border skirmishes to full-
out war? The only guidance given to a judge interpreting this modifier is 
found in paragraph three of Annex II to the amendments, which states 
“[t]he term ‘manifest’ is an objective qualification.”103 However, this 
objectivity requirement does little to clear up the vagueness of what 
constitutes a manifest violation. Unfortunately, this term also draws no 
support from history, as neither the United Nations Charter nor Resolution 
3314 incorporates a “manifest” requirement into their definitions.104 Thus, 
in the history of the work on aggression, the notion of a “manifest 
violation” is new and, consequently, has drawn criticism for its 
abstraction.105 As a result, judges at the ICC left with determining what 
constitutes a manifest violation will likely be forced to determine the 
threshold themselves. 
Yet, evidence in the supplements to the text of the amendments, 
coupled with the overall mission of the ICC itself, indicates that the 
manifest threshold will be construed as a high one. In other words, a judge 
 
 101. See HARRY S. TRUMAN RESEARCH INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEACE, THE HEBREW 
UNIV., RELIGIOUS RADICALISM AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1 (Emmanuel Sivan & Menachem 
Friedman eds., 1990) (stating that the emergence of radical religious extremism in the Middle East has a 
significant impact on politics in the region).  
 102. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis(1).  
 103. Id. at Annex II, art. 8bis(3).  
 104. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 726.  
 105. Id.  
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faced with determining whether a violation is “manifest” will likely 
interpret this term to include only a narrow category of the gravest acts of 
aggression. First, any judge faced with this dilemma will likely look to 
Canada’s Understanding 7, which states that “the three components of 
character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a ‘manifest’ 
determination. No one component can be significant enough to satisfy the 
manifest standard by itself.”106 By requiring a combination of at least two 
of these components,107 the delegations drafting the Understandings 
exempted perpetrators of violations that only satisfy one criterion. 
Furthermore, Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute reads “[t]he jurisdiction of 
the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole.”108 Given that the act of aggression in 
question must satisfy at least two of the criteria of character, gravity, and 
scale to a sufficient degree and that the crime of aggression itself must be 
one of “the most serious” of all crimes of aggression for the Court to 
exercise its jurisdiction, it is likely that “manifest” will be interpreted to 
include only those situations where the violation of the United Nations 
Charter is so blatant that it is readily distinguishable by the reasonable 
observer. 
3. What Mens Rea Element Must Be Satisfied by a Leader to Merit 
Prosecution for the Crime of Aggression? 
Specifically in common law jurisdictions, it is often required that, to 
be found guilty, the accused must have possessed the requisite mental state, 
or mens rea, enumerated in the definition of the crime.109 However, Article 
8bis lacks any indication of what mens rea requirement must be fulfilled by 
a leader to have engaged in the crime of aggression.110 Unlike Article 6’s 
definition of genocide,111 this crime does not require special intent on the 
part of the perpetrator to commit the crime, which could lead to significant 
confusion when attempting to assess whether the person was planning, 
 
 106. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex III, para. 7 (emphasis added).  
 107. Some have criticized the wording of this last sentence as it makes it unclear as to whether all 
three components must be present for there to be a manifest violation, or if it can be satisfied with only 
two. Heinsch, supra note 12 at 728. Either way, a judge interpreting this understanding will likely 
acknowledge that the drafters intend for the language to exclude lesser acts of aggression that might 
only satisfy one condition.  
 108. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5(1) (emphasis added). 
 109. See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the 
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 636 (1993).  
 110. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 732.  
 111. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6 (stating that to be considered genocide, the act must be 
“committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”).  
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preparing, initiating, or executing a manifest violation of the United 
Nations Charter.112 
However, by assessing the definition in relation to both its own 
supplements and the Rome Statute itself, judges at the ICC will likely 
determine that the mens rea requirement is one of intent or knowledge.113 
First, because the actual definition lacks this fundamental component of 
criminal law, it is safe to assume that the drafters intended the mens rea 
requirement of the crime of aggression to be governed by the general mens 
rea provision found in Article 30 of the Rome Statute. Article 30 states that 
“[u]nless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if 
the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.”114 It 
further defines intent to include circumstances where the person “means to 
engage in the conduct” or “means to cause that consequence or is aware 
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”115 Likewise, it defines 
knowledge as an “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence 
will occur in the ordinary course of events.”116 Given the clause “unless 
otherwise provided,” Article 30 contemplates that the drafters of the 
different crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction might intentionally leave the 
mens rea requirement blank in order for it to be covered by this default 
clause. 
Similarly, the amendments to Article 8bis make it all the more 
apparent that the drafters at Kampala intended for Article 30’s default 
provision to apply. First, paragraphs two and four of Annex II to the 
amendments state “[t]here is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator 
has made a legal evaluation as to whether the use of armed force was 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations” and “[t]here is no 
requirement to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to 
the ‘manifest’ nature of the violation of the Charter of the United Nations,” 
respectively.117 These provisions nullify any “mistake of law” defense that 
the accused might raise; simply because the accused was not aware of the 
fact that his actions were legally inconsistent with the UN Charter or that 
his actions constituted a “manifest” violation does not preclude him from 
 
 112. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis.  
 113. This is to say that one must either intend, or act for the purpose of bringing about, a result or 
have knowledge, that is know or reasonably believe, that his actions will lead to a certain result. Rollin 
M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905, 911, 921 (1939).  
 114. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 30 (emphasis added).  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex II, art. 8bis (emphasis added).  
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prosecution. Instead, Annex II indicates that, to be liable for the crime of 
aggression, the perpetrator must be “aware of the factual circumstances 
that established that such a use of armed force was inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations” and must be “aware of the factual 
circumstances that established such a manifest violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations,” respectively.118 These amendments, echoing the term 
“awareness” from Article 30, indicate that knowledge of the factual 
circumstances surrounding the act of aggression is the dispositive factor in 
a mens rea analysis.119 
However, the use of Article 30 as a default does present a problem 
unique to the crime of aggression; in both its definition of “intent” and 
“knowledge” Article 30 states that, to be liable, an individual must either 
be aware of the consequences of his actions or aware of the fact that the 
consequences “will occur in the ordinary course of events.”120 This 
presumption that a consequence will occur in the “ordinary course of 
events” proves problematic for a crime where there is no established 
ordinary course of events. While waging an aggressive war was considered 
a crime in World War II,121 humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was 
not.122 Scholars, however, have addressed this concern by remarking that 
the mens rea requirement must be read along with the term “manifest 
violation” in Article 8bis.123 In doing so, it becomes evident that good-faith 
errors124 do not fall under the mens rea requirement because, if the action 
were taken in good-faith, the actor would not likely expect his actions to 
constitute a manifest violation in the ordinary course of events.125 Instead, 
while the actor need not legally determine whether his action is a manifest 
violation or inconsistent with the Charter, this theory posits that the 
perpetrator needs to display malicious intent or, at a minimum, a conscious 
 
 118. Id. (emphasis added). This differentiation suggests that the perpetrator must be aware that his 
actions actually occurred and led to the resulting consequences but not that his actions would be illegal 
or a manifest violation under the UN Charter.  
 119. See Heinsch, supra note 12, at 732-33.  
 120. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 30(2).  
 121. See Trahan, supra note 7, at 50.  
 122. See Klinton W. Alexander, NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating 
Yugoslavia’s National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 
403, 449 (2000) (stating that the NATO intervention was in accordance with customary international 
law).  
 123. Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, Permanent Representative to the U.N. & the Assembly of States 
Parties for the Union Internationale des Avocats, Address at The Road From Kampala Conference: An 
Analysis of the First ICC Review Conference of the Rome Statute (Nov. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/#webcasts (part 1). 
 124. This is to say, actions that resulted in a manifest violation but were done in good faith.  
 125. Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 123. 
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apathy as to the lawfulness of his actions in order to satisfy the mens rea 
requirement.126 In this sense, the results of World War II and Kosovo can 
be squared with the mens rea requirement found in the crime of aggression 
amendments. The Nazi acts of aggression during World War II were in 
direct violation of non-aggression treaties127 and therefore, in the least, 
constituted apathy for the law. However, the actions taken by NATO in 
Kosovo, which the NATO forces claimed to be consistent with United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions,128 arguably, fall under the good-faith 
error category. However, this is not to say that all actions taken under the 
auspices of humanitarian intervention will be saved from the crime of 
aggression; only those acts of aggression that – on the facts of the case – 
can accurately be determined as good faith efforts for the sake of 
humanitarianism will be exempt from the mens rea requirement. 
4. Is the List of Acts of Aggression an Exhaustive List of those Acts 
that Will Trigger a Potential Crime of Aggression? 
Paragraph two of Article 8bis lists seven actions that shall be 
considered acts of aggression “in accordance with United Nations General 
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.”129 While these 
enumerated acts are replicated verbatim from Article 3 of the General 
Assembly Resolution,130 the definition does not discuss the possibility of 
other situations falling under the category of acts of aggression. This 
omission begs the question as to whether the drafters intended to limit the 
acts that constitute aggression to those enumerated on the list or if they 
intended to use these acts as a set of most common examples that are listed 
only for the purpose of guiding judges at the ICC in their own 
determinations. 
While the text of Article 8bis is unclear in this regard, it does provide 
a clue in requiring that the acts shall be considered aggressive if such a 
determination is made “in accordance” with Resolution 3314.131 Article 4 
of Resolution 3314 states “[t]he acts enumerated [in Article 3] are not 
exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts 
constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter.”132 Arguably, the 
 
 126. Id.  
 127. See, e.g., German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact (Jan. 26, 1934), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk01.asp.  
 128. See Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 
12 (1999).  
 129. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis(2).  
 130. Compare id., with Definition of Aggression, supra note 71, art. 3.  
 131. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis(2). 
 132. Definition of Aggression, supra note 71, art. 4.  
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fact that an act of aggression with regard to Article 8bis is to be determined 
“in accordance” with Resolution 3314 indicates that it will be determined 
in accordance with Article 4 as well. Following this logic, the acts 
enumerated in Article 8bis are therefore also non-exhaustive. However, if 
one accepts this line of reasoning, further analysis must be conducted; 
would a judge then be limited to only those non-enumerated acts that were 
determined by the Security Council as to “constitute aggression under the 
provisions of the Charter?”133 On the face of the text, yes; however, in 
considering the fear of numerous States Parties regarding the jurisdictional 
independence of the ICC from the Security Council,134 one might contend 
that the drafters did not intend to read in the right of the Security Council to 
determine which acts constitute aggression under the Rome Statute. In fact, 
Articles 15bis and 15ter both state that “[a] determination of an act of 
aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice to the 
Court’s own findings under this Statute.”135 Instead, one might infer that a 
determination made “in accordance with” Resolution 3314 need not follow 
the specific rules outlined in its articles but simply be consistent with the 
resolution’s object and purpose. 
Furthermore, regardless of a judge’s position on the Security Council 
primacy issue, the Court would still be faced with another problem if it 
interpreted the list laid out in Article 8bis as non-exhaustive: the principle 
of legality. This principle has been a long-standing tenet of criminal law, at 
least on a national level.136 It states that, in order to prosecute an individual 
for a crime, there must be a clearly defined statement of punishable acts so 
as to give the accused some form of notice.137 A non-exhaustive list would 
violate the principle of legality, as new acts would consistently be open to 
interpretation, either by the judge or the Security Council. 
Judges faced with these dilemmas will likely come to the conclusion 
that, while the list is non-exhaustive, it will be mandatory, for an act not 
already enumerated in Article 8bis, that the Security Council have made a 
previous determination that the act in question is in fact aggressive. First, 
given the political undertones of the crime of aggression, the ICC would 
likely receive great criticism—merited or not—if it were to determine an 
act not found on the list was one of aggression. Despite the potential for 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Trahan, supra note 7, at 61. 
 135. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, arts. 15bis(9) and 15ter(4) (emphasis added).  
 136. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (“No one may be required at peril 
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be 
informed as to what the State commands or forbids.”).  
 137. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 724.  
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this backlash, the text of the definition suggests that the list of acts of 
aggression is an open one. Article 8bis does not expressly limit the list in 
paragraph two and instead only requires that acts of aggression must be 
found “in accordance with” Resolution 3314.138 Consequently, it is likely 
that a judge will have the power to determine that a non-enumerated act 
was one of aggression as long as, in doing so, the judge is acting in 
conformity with Resolution 3314. 
However, because the definition does not specify as to which 
subsections of Resolution 3314 judges must consider, these determinations 
will probably have to be in accordance with the entire resolution, including 
Article 4. To do so, judges will have to square Article 4 of Resolution 3314 
with Articles 15bis and 15ter’s reference to the fact that another organ’s 
“determination of an act of aggression” does not prejudice the Court’s own 
determination.139 This distinction can be made by differentiating a 
determination as to whether an act of aggression has occurred from a 
determination as to what constitutes an act of aggression. In making an 
Article 4 decision, the Security Council would not be determining if an act 
of aggression has occurred but rather deciding on what characteristics 
actually constitute an aggressive act.140 Although rather nuanced, there is a 
distinction between the two; a determination of an act of aggression implies 
that an actual situation has occurred and the deciding body, whether the 
Court or the Security Council, is applying the definition for an act of 
aggression to the situation. Instead, a decision as to what constitutes an act 
of aggression is a theoretical one and therefore can be made in the absence 
of any actual situation. For example, if the Russians launch a cyber-attack 
on Georgia, under Article 4, the Security Council could assess the situation 
and decide that all cyber-attacks of this nature constitute acts of aggression 
under Resolution 3314. This decision would expand the definition and, as a 
result, the ICC could then claim jurisdiction over any cyber-attacks that 
constitute the requirements of the Security Council’s determination. The 
Security Council could then determine that this specific cyber-attack, from 
Russia to Georgia, is an act of aggression in its own right. It is here that 
Articles 15bis and 15ter allow for the ICC to make an unprejudiced 
determination; while the Security Council’s decision that a cyber-attack 
constitutes an act of aggression allows for the Court to take on the Russian-
Georgian situation, the Security Council’s determination that an act of 
aggression actually occurred in Georgia does not mean that the ICC needs 
 
 138. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis(2).  
 139. See id. at Annex I, arts. 15bis(9) and 15ter(4).  
 140. See id.; see also Definition of Aggression, supra note 71, art. 4.  
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to determine the same. Instead, the ICC is free to exercise its jurisdiction 
over this new act of aggression as it sees fit. 
This analysis still leaves the principle of legality dilemma. Yet the 
open list in Article 8bis, while troubling on a national level with regard to 
this principle, is not as much of an issue in the international realm. Both the 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia 
and the Rome Statute itself have areas where “open” clauses arise, 
indicating – to some degree – that this is an acceptable practice in 
international criminal law.141 Yet what might be acceptable for other crimes 
might not be as easy to swallow for the crime of aggression given its 
political nature. For this reason, it is likely that judges will limit themselves 
to the Security Council restriction in Article 4 of Resolution 3314. In this 
way the drafters will be interpreting the amendment “narrowly and ejusdem 
generis142 with the existing list.”143 In doing so, judges will ensure that any 
act of aggression that falls outside of the enumerated list has been rightfully 
characterized as one by the Security Council, the international political 
institution responsible for making a decision as to what constitutes an act of 
aggression.144 As a result, the judges of the ICC will remove themselves 
from the political nature of the determination of an act of aggression and 
instead be able to focus in the actual crime itself. 
B. Questions Surrounding Articles 15bis and 15ter and the Entry in Force 
and Exercise of Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression 
1. When Do the Crime of Aggression Amendments Enter into Force 
and Over Whom Do They Grant the Court Jurisdiction? 
The entry into force mechanism for the crime of aggression 
amendments was a topic of heated debate at the Kampala conference.145 
The final structure of the amendments indicates that they must enter into 
force under Article 121(5), which allows the Court to exercise jurisdiction 
over a State one year after it ratifies the amendments.146 In addition, the 
amendments stipulate that a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of States 
 
 141. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 724-25 (indicating that the ICTY statute’s definition of violations 
of the laws of war states “[s]uch violations shall include, but not be limited to” while the Rome 
Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity in Article 7(1)(k) allows for the prosecution of “other 
inhumane acts of similar character” to those enumerated).  
 142. Meaning “of the same class.” 
 143. Clark, supra note 19, at 696.  
 144. See U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression . . . .”).  
 145. Trahan, supra note 7, at 84-85. The approval vote must be taken at least one year after thirty 
states ratify the amendment and cannot be taken any earlier than January 1, 2017. Id. 
 146. See The Amendments, supra note 70, para. 1.  
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Parties must reapprove the amendments at least one year after thirty states 
have ratified them, but no earlier than January 1, 2017, before they may 
enter into force.147 Some commentators have found these additional 
requirements puzzling; if the amendments are so explicit about entering 
into force in accordance with Article 121(5), should not the amendments 
enter into force once the requirements of Article 121(5) have been 
satisfied? If so, what purpose do these extra restrictions serve? At least 
some scholars have suggested that this dual entry into force mechanism 
implies that one set of criteria is for ratifying States Parties only and the 
other set is for all States Parties, whether they ratify the amendments or 
not.148 According to this theory, the amendments will enter into force 
immediately for those States Parties that deposit ratifications in accordance 
with Article 121(5) and that, upon achieving thirty ratifications and a two-
thirds majority after 2017, the amendments will enter into force for all 
States Parties.149 
Despite the potential for this interpretation, it is likely that the judges 
of the ICC will determine that both entry into force procedures will be 
necessary for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over any States Parties, 
whether it has ratified the amendments or not. First, one can decipher from 
the wording of Articles 15bis and 15ter that the drafters intended to give 
the Court jurisdiction only upon the satisfaction of these extra restrictions. 
The amendments state “[t]he Court may exercise jurisdiction only with 
respect to crimes of aggression committed one year” after the deposit of 
thirty ratifications.150 Furthermore, the amendments also state that the 
Court “shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in 
accordance with this article, subject to a decision to be taken after 1 
January 2017” by a two-thirds majority.151 The use of “only” and “subject 
to” in these clauses seems to indicate that drafters intended that the 
amendments should not go into force for any State, regardless of 
ratification, until these two requirements were fulfilled. 
Practically speaking, this interpretation makes sense as well. First, the 
delay period built into the amendments by these extra hurdles allows for 
scholarly work to address the questions that remain in the text and posit 
interpretations that can then be assessed by judges before they need to 
make final determinations. Similarly, the delay period gives the legislators 
of the ratifying States Parties time to develop new criminal laws to fall in 
 
 147. See id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(2)-(3).  
 148. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 737.  
 149. Id.  
 150. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(2) and 15ter(2) (emphasis added).  
 151. Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(3) and 15ter(3) (emphasis added).  
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line with the amendments.152 As the ICC is a court of complementarity,153 it 
cannot exercise its jurisdiction if a national court has begun a “genuine” 
investigation into the matter.154 This delay period gives States an adequate 
time frame within which to establish their laws and procedures for an 
investigation into a crime of aggression if they so choose. Likewise, having 
only come into power in 2002, the ICC is still a court very much in its 
infancy; in fact, it has yet to even complete its first trial.155 This delay 
period provides the Court with the opportunity to finish a case and build its 
legitimacy as an international institution before exercising jurisdiction over 
a politically infused crime like the crime of aggression.156 For both these 
practical reasons, as well as textual ones, a judge will likely determine that 
the amendments have not entered into force for any States Parties until this 
delay mechanism is satisfied. 
2. How Does the Entry into Force of the Crime of Aggression 
Amendments Under Article 121(5) Fit with the Court’s Jurisdiction Under 
Article 12? 
In both Articles 15bis and 15ter it is stated that the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with Article 12.157 
Article 12(1) states that “[a] State which becomes a Party to this Statute 
thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes 
referred to in article 5.”158 Article 12(2) further states that the Court’s 
jurisdiction is triggered if the “territory of which the conduct in question 
occurred” is that of a State Party or “the person accused of the crime is a 
 
 152. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 738.  
 153. As a court of complementarity, the ICC may only assume jurisdiction over a situation if the 
national courts of the country in which it occurred are unable or unwilling to investigate the crime. In 
this way, the ICC “complements” national courts. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, at preamble 
(“Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions . . . .”) and art. 17 (“. . . the court shall determine that a 
case is inadmissible where the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it . . . .”).  
 154. Id. art. 17. The term genuine “connotes a certain basic level of objective quality.” A genuine 
investigation is defined as one in which a State is both willing and able to provide an adequate 
investigation and subsequent prosecution. See ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INFORMAL EXPERT 
PAPER: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE at 8 (2003), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/complementarity.pdf.  
 155. The Court’s first case commenced in 2009 and is still ongoing. See Democratic Republic of 
Congo: ICC-01/04-01/06–Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ 
ICC+0104/Related+Cases/ICC+0104+0106/Democratic+Republic+of+the+Congo.htm (last visited 
April 8, 2011).  
 156. See Heinsch, supra note 12, at 738. 
 157. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, arts. 15bis(2) and 15ter(2).  
 158. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(1).  
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national” of a State Party.159 Articles 15bis and 15ter go on to provide an 
exemption from the Court’s jurisdiction, under Article 12, for States Parties 
that ratify the amendments and then lodge a declaration opting out.160 
However, Article 12 still poses a dilemma for States Parties that decide not 
to ratify the amendments at all. A State Party that has ratified the Rome 
Statute has already ratified Article 12 and therefore given the ICC 
jurisdiction, with respect to its territory and nationals, over the crimes in 
Article 5, including the crime of aggression, which is mentioned in Article 
5(2).161 However, as previously mentioned, the crime of aggression 
amendments indicate in paragraph one that they enter into force in 
accordance with Article 121(5).162 According to the second sentence of 
Article 121(5), if that same State Party does not ratify the crime of 
aggression amendments “the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction” over 
its “nationals or on its territory.”163 Thus, Article 12(2) appears to give the 
Court jurisdiction over the crime of aggression with regard to the nationals 
or territory of any State Party to the Rome Statute. However, Article 121(5) 
appears to allow for States Parties to refuse the Court’s jurisdiction over 
this very same crime. Under this analysis, there seems to be a tension 
between these two articles. 
However, upon closer inspection of the articles, it is evident that this 
tension does not actually exist. Article 12(2) specifically states “the Court 
may exercise its jurisdiction” over a State Party164 while Article 121(5) says 
“the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction” over a non-ratifying State 
Party.165 The difference between the wording of these two articles indicates 
that Article 121(5) (a “shall” provision) is mandatory while Article 12(2) (a 
“may” provision) is permissive.166 Under Article 12, the ICC has the option 
to exercise its jurisdiction for the crime of aggression over a State Party. 
But, under Article 121(5), this option is removed if that State Party has not 
ratified the crime of aggression amendments.167 In essence, the mandatory 
provision of Article 121(5) trumps the permissive provision of Article 
 
 159. Id. art. 12(2).  
 160. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I art. 15bis(2) and 15ter(2).  
 161. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5(2), 12(1).  
 162. The Amendments, supra note 70, para. 1.  
 163. Id. art. 121(5).  
 164. Id. art. 12(2) (emphasis added).  
 165. Id. art. 121(5) (emphasis added).  
 166. Robert Manson, Kampala Review Conference Delegate for the U.K. Coal. for the ICC, 
Address at The Road From Kampala Conference: An Analysis of the First ICC Review Conference of 
the Rome Statute (Nov. 13, 2010), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/#webcasts (part 3). 
 167. See id.  
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12.168 A judge faced with this tension will likely have no problem deciding 
in this manner. This construction fits perfectly with Article 5(2) which 
states that “The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 
123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”169 The second 
half of this sentence implies that the criteria for the Court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over crime of aggression are to be found in the text of Article 
121. Seeing as Article 12 derives its jurisdiction by referencing the crimes 
in Article 5170 and Article 5(2) specifically references Article 121, it is easy 
to interpret Article 12’s jurisdictional structure as a supplement to that 
which is laid out in Article 121(5).171 
3. What Is the Difference Between a State Party Refusing to Ratify the 
Amendments and a State Party Ratifying but Opting Out of Them? 
States Parties have two different opportunities to reject the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over their nationals or territory with regard to the crime of 
aggression. First, the second sentence of Article 121(5) states “[i]n respect 
of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not 
exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when 
committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory.”172 Second, 
Article 15bis states that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over a crime of 
aggression “arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, 
unless that State Party has previously declared that it does not accept such 
jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar.”173 Thus, a State 
can either not ratify the amendments or ratify them but “opt-out” of the 
Court’s jurisdiction. Yet, why, if a State Party that has not ratified the 
amendments is exempt from the Court’s jurisdiction, would a State Party 
ever ratify the amendments and then subsequently opt-out? Does the opt-
out provision provide a State Party with a different set of rights and 
obligations from those it would retain simply by not ratifying the 
amendment in the first place? Some have interpreted this opt-out provision 
as an indication that all States Parties are meant to fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Court once the requirements in Article 15bis are 
fulfilled, namely that thirty States Parties have ratified the amendments and 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5(2) (emphasis added).  
 170. See id. art. 12(1) (“A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the 
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.”) (emphasis added).  
 171. See Manson, supra note 53, at 424-25.  
 172. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5).  
 173. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(4).  
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a two-thirds majority votes in favor of the amendments after January 1, 
2017.174 In this way, States Parties who have not ratified the amendment 
will become de facto bound by it once this requirement is satisfied. Only 
those States Parties that have ratified the amendment and opted out can be 
assured that they will not be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.175 
Here, the purpose of allowing for States Parties to either not ratify the 
amendment or ratify and opt-out seems to be a practical one. As both 
Articles 15bis and 15ter require thirty State Party ratifications to enter into 
force, ratifications will be necessary for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction 
regardless of whether the Security Council has referred the situation to the 
Court or the Court has taken on the case as a result of a State Party referral 
or under the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers.176 However, a State Party 
might be in favor of giving the Court jurisdiction over crimes of aggression 
that are referred by the Security Council while still being hesitant to allow 
for the Court to exercise its power under the State Party referral and 
proprio motu triggers.177 The opt-out provision, therefore, allows for a 
State Party to indicate that it seeks to give the Security Council the power 
to refer a situation regarding an act of aggression to the Court without 
giving the Court power to take on similar situations with regard to its 
territory and nationals under the other two triggers.178 This interpretation is 
supported by the fact that the opt-out provision is only contained in Article 
15bis, which deals with the State Party referral and proprio motu 
triggers.179 By allowing for this loophole, the drafters have made it easier 
for States Parties to ratify the amendments and, presumably, for the 
amendments to enter into force more quickly. 
Yet this analysis provides those States Parties who have ratified and 
opted out an unfair advantage over those parties who chose not to ratify the 
amendment at all. Article 121(5) states that the ICC cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over a crime of aggression “when committed by that State 
Party’s nationals or on its territory” for those States Parties that have not 
ratified the amendments.180 However, the clause in Articles 15bis states 
that, for States Parties that opt out of the amendments, the Court may not 
 
 174. This interpretation falls in line with an argument rejected earlier in favor of interpreting the 
combination of Article 121(5) and the restrictions found in Articles 15bis and 15ter as applying to the 
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over any States Parties, including those who have ratified the 
amendments. See supra Part II(B)(1) of this section.  
 175. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 739.  
 176. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, arts. 15bis(2) and 15ter(2).  
 177. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 739.  
 178. Id.  
 179. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, arts. 15bis(4) and 15ter.  
 180. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5) (emphasis added).  
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exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression “arising from an act of 
aggression committed by [that] State Party.”181 This differentiation seems to 
indicate that, while the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction over a crime of 
aggression where a non-ratifying State Party is the victim (one which is “on 
its territory”), it may do so for a State Party that has opted out (as it would 
not have been “committed by” that State Party).182 This arrangement would 
afford an opting-out State Party protection against crimes of aggression 
directed toward it, while allowing the same State to claim immunity for 
crimes of aggression conducted by its nationals. 
While this imbalance might seem troubling, politically, it provides 
motivation for States Parties to ratify the amendments; a State Party that 
ratifies the amendments but opts-out of the Court’s jurisdiction preserves 
its right to engage in what might be considered an aggressive act without 
the potential for the prosecution of its leaders but still protects its territorial 
sovereignty in case it finds itself on the other end of an aggressive act. 
Though this loophole might lend itself to abuse by States Parties, it is likely 
the drafters saw it as better than the alternative. Presumably, States Parties 
who opt out of the amendment do so because they fear their leaders will be 
prosecuted for their aggressive acts. Were they not given the opportunity to 
opt out, these States Parties would likely not ratify the amendment at all to 
ensure the same protection for their nationals existed under the protection 
of Article 121(5).183 These lost ratifications might prevent the crime of 
aggression amendments from going into force altogether. However, if 
given the opportunity to have their cake and eat it too, so to speak, these 
States Parties will be enticed to support the overall jurisdiction of the crime 
of aggression, which will lead to a speedier entry into force. Furthermore, 
the amendments provide for a reassessment of any opt-out declaration 
lodged by a State Party within three years of its submission.184 This 
mandatory reassessment might put political pressure on these countries to 
revoke their opt-out declaration at a later date if the international 
community finds that they are abusing it. Considering that the Kampala 
compromises probably left few states entirely happy,185 the drafters likely 
sought to entice ratifications from those States Parties that were on the 
fence with regard to the amendments. While compromises, such as the opt-
out provision, were not exactly considered desirable by all the delegates at 
Kampala, they are probably necessary to obtain the number of ratifications 
 
 181. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(4).  
 182. Stahn, supra note 65, at 878.  
 183. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5). 
 184. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(4).  
 185. Trahan, supra note 7, at 82.  
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required for the entry into force of the crime.186 In providing these benefits 
to States Parties that ratify the amendments, the drafters have made it easier 
for the overall crime of aggression regime to move forward with the 
support of countries that would not do so otherwise. 
4. On Which State’s Territory Does a Crime of Aggression Take 
Place? 
While most crimes usually occur on the territorial jurisdiction of one 
state, the nature of a crime of aggression—a crime that is usually launched 
from one state and impacts another—makes it unclear as to where the 
actual crime takes place. Seeing as the crime of aggression exempts certain 
situations based on the country’s territory on which it occurs, the answer to 
this question might indicate whether the Court has the jurisdiction to 
prosecute a case or not. The definition indicates that acts of aggression 
usually take place in the victim state.187 Following this logic, for 
jurisdictional purposes, the crime of aggression should occur in the victim’s 
territory. However, according to Article 8bis(1) the actual crime committed 
is the “planning, preparation, initiation or execution” done by a leader.188 
Following this logic, the acts that constitute the crime will likely take place 
in the territory of the aggressor.189 This dual-territoriality poses an 
interesting problem when a ratifying State Party commits an act of 
aggression on either a non-State Party or on a non-ratifying State Party. For 
a non-ratifying State Party, Article 121(5) exempts crimes of aggression 
committed on its territory from the jurisdiction of the Court.190 For a non-
State Party, the amendments exempt crimes of aggression that occur on its 
territory.191 However, given that the planning, preparation, or initiation 
usually occurs on the territory of the aggressor state, a judge might interpret 
that the aggressor’s territory is applicable for a determination of 
jurisdiction, not the victims. If the aggressor is a ratifying State Party, this 
territorial determination might grant the Court jurisdiction over the offense, 
 
 186. See Astrid Reisinger Coracini, Professor at the Institute of Int’l Law & Int’l Relations of the 
Univ. of Graz & Exec. Dir. of the Salzburg Law Sch. on Int’l Criminal Law, Humanitarian Law & 
Human Rights Law, Address at The Road From Kampala Conference: An Analysis of the First ICC 
Review Conference of the Rome Statute (Nov. 13, 2010), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/ 
webcast/#webcasts (part 3). 
 187. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis (2) (stating that acts of aggression 
include, inter alia, the “invasion,” “bombardment,” and “use of armed forces” by one state within “the 
territory of another state”).  
 188. Id. at Annex I, art. 8bis (1). 
 189. See Clark, supra note 19, at 705. 
 190. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5).  
 191. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(5).  
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even though the actual result was felt on the territory of either a non-State 
Party or a non-ratifying State Party. 
Despite the creativity of this legal argument, a judge will likely 
interpret the notion of territoriality narrowly: both the victim State and the 
aggressor State must have ratified the amendments for the Court to be able 
to exercise jurisdiction over the situation. This interpretation is consistent 
with the rule of effect and the idea of “objective territorial jurisdiction” and 
further seems to be the case with the other crimes under the ICC’s 
mandate.192 On a practical level, given that the Court is in its infancy, it is 
also likely that it will not want to jeopardize the development of its 
legitimacy by exercising jurisdiction, even if it is only partial jurisdiction, 
over the territory of a State that has not ratified the amendments. This 
action would further be in contravention of the notion of sovereignty, 
which is recognized under the United Nations Charter, a document that is 
acknowledged consistently throughout the crime of aggression 
amendments.193 Likewise, given the fact that the drafters provided two 
different means by which States Parties could avoid the Court’s jurisdiction 
with regard to the crime of aggression,194 it would seem contradictory for a 
judge to then exercise jurisdiction over these States Parties or non-States 
Parties through a backdoor mechanism. 
5. What Acts Must Be Taken by the Security Council to Constitute a 
“Determination” Under Article 15bis? 
The role of the Security Council in determining whether an act of 
aggression has occurred was one of the most contentious and important 
issues at Kampala.195 To appease both sides of this argument, the drafters 
of the amendments instituted a provision making the Court’s ability to 
exercise jurisdiction contingent on whether or not the Security Council has 
made a “determination.”196 However, the text of the amendments does not 
define what a Security Council determination actually entails. Furthermore, 
while the text indicates what the ICC can do in the case of a positive 
determination by the Security Council that an act of aggression has 
 
 192. Clark, supra note 19, at 705.  
 193. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7; see generally The Amendments, supra note 70 (referencing 
the U.N. Charter several times).  
 194. These two means are refusing to ratify the amendments or opting out of them. See Rome 
Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5); see also The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(4).  
 195. See Marcelo Bohlke, Legal Advisor & Sixth Comm. Delegate for the Permanent Mission for 
Braz. to the U.N., The Road From Kampala Conference: An Analysis of the First ICC Review 
Conference of the Rome Statute, part 2 (Nov. 13, 2010), http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/#webcasts. 
 196. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(6)-(8).  
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occurred197 and has indicated what it must do in the case that the Security 
Council has not made a determination at all,198 it does not speak as to what 
happens when the Security Council has made a negative determination, or 
one in which it deems that an act of aggression has not occurred.199 Article 
15bis(9) does say “[a] determination of an act of aggression by an organ 
outside the Court shall be without prejudice to the Court’s own findings 
under this Statute.”200 Yet it seems redundant then to emphasize the waiting 
period that must occur if the Security Council has made no determination 
when, if the Security Council ends up making a negative determination, it 
would have no effect on the Prosecutor’s investigation whatsoever. 
Given the concerns voiced at Kampala over the Security Council’s 
potential infringement on the ICC’s independence, it is no surprise that 
Article 15bis does not prevent an investigation from occurring if the 
Security Council makes a negative determination. While some delegates 
would have preferred this course,201 providing the Security Council total 
control was criticized by the vast majority of the delegations at Kampala 
and could have led to a failure to garner a consensus.202 Furthermore, if the 
Security Council were to seek to prevent ICC prosecution, it is not without 
options; Article 16 of the Rome Statute reads: 
 
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with 
under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in 
a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be 
renewed by the Council under the same conditions.203 
 
While this measure is only temporary, it does provide the Security 
Council with the opportunity to halt an investigation in hopes of giving the 
two parties to the dispute the chance to continue negotiations on their 
own.204 
Yet this answer still does not define what the amendments actually 
mean when they mention a Security Council “determination.” Instead, a 
judge seeking to define “determination” will have to look to the past 
 
 197. Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(7).  
 198. Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(8).  
 199. David Scheffer, The Complex Crime of Aggression Under the Rome Statute, 23 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. 897, 901 (2010) (Neth.).  
 200. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(9).  
 201. See Scheffer, supra note 199, at 902.  
 202. See Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1194.  
 203. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 16.  
 204. See Scheffer, supra note 199, at 902.  
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interaction between the ICC and the Security Council as well as the Rome 
Statute itself. In doing so, a judge will likely construe “determination” 
narrowly, that is to say, to include only formal resolutions offered by the 
Security Council. Under Article 13(b), the Court may exercise jurisdiction 
if “[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”205 So far, any 
Article 13(b) referrals from the Security Council have come in the form of 
a formal resolution.206 While a formal resolution might seem more difficult 
to obtain, especially given that three of the permanent five members 
wielding vetoes on the Security Council are non-States Parties,207 the fact 
that the Prosecutor may engage in an investigation regardless of the 
Security Council determination means that, were the Security Council to 
refuse to present a formal resolution referring the situation, the Prosecutor 
would only need to wait six months to arrange for an investigation under 
his proprio motu powers. On the contrary, requiring a formal resolution to 
trigger a Security Council referral ensures that the Prosecutor does not 
jump the gun with regard to these six months when the Security Council 
has not come to a formal agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The crime of aggression amendments passed at the Kampala Review 
Conference were a historic achievement in the development of the 
International Criminal Court. Though the text of the amendments has led to 
questions regarding the elements of the crime and the ICC’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over it, it is evident from this analysis that appropriate 
interpretations can be formulated by reading it in conjunction with the 
Rome Statute and with regard to the current state of the Court itself. With 
potential trials for crimes of aggression delayed until at least 2017, more 
analysis must be done in the upcoming years as the Court grows as an 
institution to determine the appropriate means by which the amendments 
should be interpreted. Once the Court has gained jurisdiction over the 
crime, the development of precedent will eventually provide an 
understanding that will be more easily applied to each situation it faces. 
 
 205. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b).  
 206. See generally S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26 2011); see also S.C. Res. 1593, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).  
 207. Those three are China, Russia, and the United States. See U.N. Charter art. 23; see also The 
States Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2011).  
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